## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

## STATE OF GEORGIA

ED IV! 〜

TONY L. WARE, CEO and

T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NUMBER: 2004CV94553

FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP.

F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP.

STIPULATIONS TO FINAL JUDGMENT

# STIPULATIONS TO ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

COMPANY, INC., the Plaintiffs and files their legal Stipulations with the Court Based upon the record in this action, the evidence presented to the Court by the Plaintiffs and with the consent of the Plaintiffs and applicable State law See, O C G A § 9-11-55(a) The parties do hereby stipulate to the following matters

- 1 The Plaintiffs do hereby stipulate and consent to the entry of the Final Judgment and Decree as it is signed by the Plaintiffs in its printed form
- 2 The Plaintiffs do hereby stipulate and consent to the Final Judgment's legal findings of fact and conclusions of law contain therein the Final Judgment
- 3 The Plaintiffs further stipulate and consent to any Presiding Judge of this Court to hear the Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment and further consent to a final hearing and the entry of such Consent Final Judgment on the Plaintiffs' motion
- 4 The Plaintiffs waive their right to a trial by jury on the issue of damages contingent upon the Consent Judgment being entered by the Court as signed by the Plaintiffs without being set aside by any Appeals Court

Defendant.

This <u>27th</u>, day of \_ 2 3 Agreed and Consented to By: Agreed and Consented to By: 5 Michael R. Johnson, Sr. Tony L. Ware, JD, Plaintiff 6 **Attorney for the Plaintiff** Chairman & CEO Georgia Bar No. 395056 1033 Kipling Street S.E. Johnson & Associates, P. C. Atlanta, Georgia 30315-7030 340 West Peachtree Street, N.E. (404) 945-0342 Suite 200 9 Atlanta, Georgia 30308 10 (404) 688-7100 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TONY L. WARE, CEO and T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC.,

Plaintiffs,

YS.

FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP.

F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP.

Defendant.

DEFUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT

FILED IN OFFICE

**CIVIL ACTION** 

FILE NUMBER: 2004CV94553

) FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE

PRESIDING JUDGE BROGDON

# FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE

This civil matter having come before this Court on a final hearing on the Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A § 9-11-55(a) and their Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(a) with the consent of the Plaintiffs in this action. Based upon the record in this action, the evidence presented to the Court by the parties and applicable State law the Court finds that as a matter of law sufficient grounds exist for the granting thereof. The Court hereby GRANT the Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment and enters final judgment as follows.

#### I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court makes the following findings of fact

The Paintiffs Tony L Ware, CEO and TL Ware Bottling Company, Inc., brought this civil action on December 7th, 2004 based upon their ten count Complaint for Damages. Injunction, RICO violations, Fraud, Gross Negligence and other violations of both Federal and State laws and further requesting injunctive and other equitable relief concerning all other claims and disputes against the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation f/k/a/ BankBoston Corporation

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Defendant FleetBostion is a foreign corporation having withdrawn from doing business in this State pursuant to O C G A § 14-2-1520(b). After proper service of process of the Summons and Complaint on December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2004 on the Defendant by a Court Appointed Process Server, the Defendant failed to file its answer to the Summons and Complaint and became in default on January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005

The Court finds that fifteen (15) days having elapsed from the date of this default and the default not having been opened as a matter of right or by an order of this Court and hence the Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a judgment by default against the Defendant as a matter of law. The Plaintiffs has submitted to the Court their joint Mobion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment on the issue of damages with stipulations filed by the parties Plaintiffs. The Court finds that there are no just reasons for delay of the entry of this final judgment and therefore enters final judgment for the Plaintiffs as to all claims pursuant to O C G A § 9-11-54(b)

#### II. DISCUSSION

There is no dispute that Defendant FleetBostion is a foreign corporation withdrawn from doing business in this State pursuant to O C G A § 14-2-1520(b). See, (Plaintifis' Complaint Exhibit "A") and that proper service of process was made on the Defendant by a Court Appointed Process Server by serving the Georgia Secretary of State pursuant to O C G A § 14-2-1520(c). See, Return of Service at Docket No E4. Defendant failed to file its answer to the Summons and Complaint and became in default on January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The Plaintiffs having filed their joint Motion for Default and Summary Judgment on the issue of Damages, such motion can be heard by the Court. Therefore, the Court holds that since Defendant is in default liability is establish by the operation of law. See, O C G A § 9-11-55(a).

## III. HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES

The only issue that remain in this civil action are the issue of damages. With the consent of the Plaintiffs, the Court will entertain their joint Motion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment on the issue of pamages. Defendant has legally waived all further notices in this action pursuant to O C G A § 9-11-5(a). Defendant is not entitled to any notice of the final hearing on the Plaintiffs' joint motion.

There has been a long line of cases rendered by our Georgia Supreme Court which holds that the failure of a Defendant to file pleadings in an action is deemed a waiver by that Defendant of all further notices to that Defendant in the civil action. This includes all notices of time and place of trial and the issuing of any final decree in the action. See, <u>Lucas v. Lucas</u>, 273 Ga. 240, 539 SE2d 807 (2006), <u>Harris v. Harris</u>, 258 Ga. 496, 371 SE2d 399 (1988), <u>Hardwick v. Hardwick</u>, 245 Ga. 570, 266 SE2d 184 (1980), <u>Brooks v. Brooks</u>, 242 Ga. 444, 249 SE2d 244 (1978).

Thus, this waiver of further notices of a hearing and the time and place of trial provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(a) would control over any conflicting Court Rules. See, *Hulsey Pool Co. v. Troutman.* 167 Ga. App. 192, 306 SE2d 83 (1983).

Therefore, the Court holds that Defendant in this action has waived all notices of the entry of this final judgment as a matter of law and that the Court will turn its attention to the Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment, Summary Judgment on the issue of camages and the record in this civil proceeding

# (a) DEFENDANT FLEETBOSTION'S ADMISSIONS

When the Plaintiffs served the Defendant with their Complaint for Damages they also served the Defendant with a copy of "Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions." See, Docket No E4. Defendant also failed to answer the Plaintiffs' request for admissions in this action. See, Docket No E3. Under O C G A. § 9-11-36(a) all matters which are not denied or objected to by a Defendant shall be deemed admitted if not denied by a Defendant within the time permitted for answering a request for admissions. Because Defendant FleetBostion did not answer, object or deny the Plaintiffs' request for admissions, the Court holds that the Defendant FleetBostion made the following judicial admissions to wit

- "2 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits that it has committed all acts stated in the Plaintiffs' Complaint and that all exhibits attached thereto are also admitted as true."
- "4 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits to the Court or the Jury that the Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory property damages in the Complaint not less than the amount of \$75,507,000.00 [Seventy-five Million

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Five Hundred and Seven Thousand Dollars] and further waives all other defects and objections to the contrary in this civil action.

- "5 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits to the Court or the Jury that the Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages of not less than the amount of \$95,000,000 00 [Ninety-five Million Dollars] and further waives all other defects and objections to the contrary in this civil action."
- "6 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits to the Court or the Jury that Plaintiff is entitled to pre-interest judgment from June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1994 until the date final judgment is entered and further waives all other defects and objections to the contrary in this civil action."
- "8 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits that the Plaintiffs' Complaint for damages states a legal claim to which relief can be granted by the Court and that a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint or to set aside any final judgment under O C G A § 9-11-60(d) based upon such grounds would be without merit by the Defendant. Therefore, the Complaint states a legal claim for relief and is deemed true and correct without any objections made by the Defendant."
- "9 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts as to liability and damages and that the Plaintiffs are entitled judgment to a Summary Judgment on the issue of liability and damages as a matter of law and waives any defects or objections to the contrary."
- '11 The Defendant FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORP, admits that any amendments or withdrawal of these admissions by the Court or by the Defendant concerning the matters admitted would cause the Plaintiffs an undue burden and would be prejudice to them and the case will not be best served."

These un-withdrawn admissions made by the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation are deemed judicial admissions and cannot be overlooked or set aside by this Court. See, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36(b). The statute reads in part that

"(b) Effect of admission Any matter admitted under this Code Section is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."

## (b) TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION

This Court will only have discretion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36(b) when a party moves to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections filed in response to a request for admissions. See, *Mountain View Enters, Inc. v. Diversified Systems*. 133 Ga. App. 249, 211 SE2d 186 (1974). Defendant should have moved to amend or withdraw its admissions in order for this Court to use its discretion. However, without such a timely motion made by the Defendant FleetBoston to withdraw or amend its admissions this Court as a matter of law is without discretion, authority or jurisdiction to set aside or amend Defendant's admissions on its own motion.

## (c) GEORGIA'S SUPREME COURT RULE ON ADMISSION

This Court is also bound by the holding made by our Georgia Supreme Court in <u>G.H. Bass & Co v Fulton County Bd Of Tax Assessors</u>, 268 Ga 327, 486 SE2d 810 (1397) holding that a Defendant's un-withdrawn admissions are deemed admitted when not denied. The Georgia Supreme Court held in part that

"The [Defendant] did not move the trial court to allow the withdrawal or amendment of its admissions either before or after [the PlaIntiffs] raised the legal effect of the [Defendant's] failure to respond to its requests and did not offer any justification for its failure to respond which would have authorized the trial court to exercise its discretion under O C.G.A. § 9-11-36(b) to relieve the [Defendant] from the consequence of its admissions. Because the [Defendant] did not avail itself of any of the variety of the responses available under D C.G.A. § 9-11-36 and chose not to seek the liberal remedies afforded to parties under the statute to avoid the consequences of a failure to respond, we hold that the subject matter of [Plaintiffs'] requests for admission stood admitted."

"The language in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36(a) is clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal and means just what it says. One must comply strictly and literally with the

terms of the statute upon the peril of having his response construed to be an admission."

"While we recognize that the result on the [Defendant] may be criticized as harsh or draconian, our holding benefits both bench and bar in that it promotes constancy and stability in the law by clarifying that the plain language of a civil practice statute will be applied consistently to all parties; hence, all practitioners will be able to govern their behavior accordingly."

"Because the admissions were not withdrawn or amended, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the [Defendant's] failure to respond was a matter of no consequence"

## "Judgment reversed "

With emphases supplied and citations omitted. Thus our Georgia Court of Appeals has echoed the Georgia Supreme Court holding in its opinions in <u>Mays v</u> <u>Ed Voyles Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.</u>, 255 Ga. App. 357, 565 SE2d 515 (2002), <u>Solis v Lamb</u>, 244 Ga. App. 8, 534 SE2d 582 (2000). The Georgia Court of Appeals has ruled in <u>Mays v Ed Voyles Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.</u>, Supra, that

"A matter admitted in response to requests for admission under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36 is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.... Such a solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradicted by other evidence unless it is withdrawn or amended on formal motion."

Because this Court has already found that the Defendant has admitted that the Plaintiffs are entitled to not less than \$75,507,000,000 in property damages, \$95,000,000,000 in punitive damages and pre judgment interest from June 4th, 1994 until the date final judgment is entered in this civil action.

The Court holds that there are no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the amount of damages and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to Summary Judgment on the issue of damages as a matter of law. See, <u>Mays v Ed Voyles</u> <u>Chtysler-Plymouth, Inc.</u>, 255 Ga. App. 357, 565 SE2d 515 (2002)

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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court conclude that the Plaintiffs made proper service of process on Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation with the Summons, Complaint and Request for Admissions by serving the Georgia Secretary of State pursuant to O.C.G.A § 14-2-1520(c) the law of this State See, Docket No. E3

The Court further conclude that the Defendant is in default as a matter of law and that Defendant FleetBostion has legally waived all further notices in this action pursuant to O C G A § 9-11-5(a). This also includes notice of time and place of that and the issuing of any final judgment and decree in this civil action.

The Court further conclude that the admissions made by the Defendant FietetBoston Financial Corporation as to the amount of damages are deemed judicial admissions and cannot be overlooked by this Court and is therefore binding on this Court. See, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36(b). Because of Defendant's solemn admissions in judicio are binding, they are conclusive on the issue of damages and cannot be contradicted by other evidence unless it is withdrawn or amended on formal motion.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to relief sought and that this Court has junisdiction to grant the Plaintiffs' request for relief concerning their joint Motion for Default Judgment and Summary Judgment on the issue of damages in this civil action. See, Georgia Constitution, Article VI Section IV Paragraph I, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) and O C G.A. § 9-11-56(a)

Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, That final judgment is entered in favor of this Plaintiffs Tony L. Ware, CEO and T.L. Ware Bottling Company, Inc., against the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation in the amount of \$75,507,000 00 in property damages which damages are tripled pursuant to O.Q.G.A. § 1i3-14-6(c) the (Georgia RICO Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) the (Federal RICO Act) resulting in a total amount of \$226,521,000.00 in favor of the Plaintiffs against Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation

damages against the Defendant for its illegal actions, frauds, willful misconduct,

wanton, illegal thefts and RiCO violations in the amount of \$95,000,000 00 in punitive damages which damages are tripled pursuant to O C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c) the Georgia RiCO Act and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) the Federal RiCO Act resulting in a total amount of \$285,000,000.00 in favor of the Plaintiffs against Defendant FleetBostion

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Plaintiffs shall have prejudgment interest against the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation concerning the Plaintiffs' property damage claims from June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1994 upon entry of this judgment in the amount of \$410,746,265.24 pursuant to O C G A § 51-12-14(c). See, Affidavit at Docket No. E6. Thus, the Plaintiffs shall have a total final judgment against Defendant. FleetBoston. Financial. Corporation in the principle amount of \$511,521,000.00 and prejudgment interest in the amount of \$410,746,265.24.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Defendant shall pay any and all post judgment interest that accrues on this final judgment after the entry of this final judgment pursuant to O.C G A § 7-4-12.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Clerk of this Court shall issue a Writ of Execution (Fi Fa) in the principle amount of \$511,521,000.00 with interest in the amount of \$410,746,265.24 and the Court cost of this action. Upon the Clerk issuing the Writ of Execution (Fi Fa), Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation formerly known as BankBoston Corporation shall immediately pay and satisfy the final judgment of this Court as stated in such Writ of Execution (Fi Fa) and upon Defendant receiving a certified copy of this final judgment and the Writ of Execution

good cause to this Court why it cannot pay or satisfy the final judgment of this Court with pre judgment interest, or if the Defendant fails or refuses to make payment of the final judgment including pre judgment interest to the Plaintiffs within 7 days upon receipt of a copy this order, then the Court hereby adjudges the Defendant in civil contempt of this Court. See, <u>Griggers v Bryant</u>, 239 Ga. 244, 236 SE2d 599 (1977). <u>Wagner v Commercial</u>, Inc., 203 Ga. 1, 45 SE2d 205 (1945)

subject to pay the Plaintiff in addition to, the final judgment and post judgment interest, a civil penalty of \$25,000.00 per day until the Defendant purges itself of such contempt by complying with the terms of this final judgment. See, <u>In re Harvy</u>, 219 Ga App. 76, 464 SE2d 34 (1995). This civil penalty will only apply if the Defendant fails to comply with the terms of this order within (7) days upon receiving notice of this order by the Court or by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant, its subsidianes that are operating in his State, their officers and agents will be subject to further civil and criminal penalties and a writ of injunction that will enjoin them from operating in this State until Defendant has complied with the terms of this final judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Sheriffs of this State and their lawful Deputies are hereby ordered to take all actions needed to seize all monies, property and assets which is not exempt by law held by any persons, corporations, partnerships, banks or holding companies held on behalf of the Defendant or that is in the possession of the Defendant located within the jurisdiction of this State

supersede bonds in the amount of \$511,521,000.00 representing the principal and \$410,746,265.24 representing the pre judgment interest before the Defendant can file any pleadings, motions or appeals in this action. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed not to file any motions, appeal or any other documents into this Court on behalf of the Defendant except an affidavit by the Defendant's CEO explaining why the Defendant cannot post the supersede bonds stated in this decree. Nor shall the Clerk of this Court set any hearings on any other matter before any other Judge of this Court until said Defendant has posted a total of \$922,267,265.24 in supersede bonds with the Clerk of this Court

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, By this Court that the Clerk of this Court is also directed to served a certified copy of the Writ of Execution (Fi Fa) and this final judgment entered on the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation by U.S. Certified Mail pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1520(c) addressed to

M A. FERRUCCI, President & CEO FLEETBOSTION FINANCIAL CORPORATION c/o Cathy Cox, Secretary of State 2 Martin Luther King Jr., Drive, Suite 315 Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1530

authorized to prefect service of a copy of this final judgment and the Wnt of Execution (Fi iFa) on the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation f/k/a BankBoston Corporation by U.S. Certified Mail at any of the other addresses of the Defendant listed in the office of the North Carolina's Secretary of State. Any service made by the iClerk of this Court or the Plaintiffs in this action pursuant to this order shall be deemed perfected on the Defendant pursuant to O.C. G.A. § 14-2-1520(c)

## V. BILL OF PEACE AND INJUNCTION

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,** By this Court that the Defendant, its officers agents, its servants, its assigns and its successors (such as Bank of America) or any other person, corporation, insurance company, bank or partnership acting under the authority of the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from the following

- (a) The Defendant is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from assisting or aid and aiding its subsidiaries, its officers, agents and servants in performing any illegal acts averted by the Plaintiffs and deemed by the Court to be illegal and a fraud against the Plaintiffs and other consumers in the State of Georgia,
- (b) The Defendant is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from operating in this State without a Certificate of Authority from the Georgia Secretary of State,
- (c) The Defendant, its officers, agents and its attorneys are permanently enjoined and restrained committing any further torts agains the Plaintiffs as stated in their Complaint,
- (d) The Defendant, its officers, agents and its attorneys are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from filling any

motions, pleadings or appeals for the purpose of delaying any rights adjudicated by this Court in favor of the Plaintiffs in this civil action. Nor shall the Defendant or its attorneys acting on behalf of the Defendant file any motions, pleadings or appeals for the purpose of harassing the Plaintiffs of any rights adjudicated by the Court and

(e) Defendant its officers, agents and its attorneys are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from harassing the

(e) Defendant its officers, agents and its attorneys are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from harassing the Plaintilfs in any discovery or post judgment discovery matters by asking questions in a matter which is deemed irrelevant to the case so adjudicated by this Court or that such questions has no legal value to the Plaintiffs' claims at issue. Nor shall Defendant's attorneys file any motions or pleadings in any other Court having jurisdiction on matters already admitted to by the Defendant and matters adjudicated by this Court in this civil action.

## VI. ENFOCEMENT PROVISIONS OF FINAL JUDGMENT

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, By this Court that it shall be the duty of the Shetiffs of this State located within their legal jurisdiction where all provisions of this final judgment can be enforced against the Defendant FleetBoston and that said officer or officers shall take all actions and proper steps needed when requested to do sp by the Plaintiffs in enforcing this final judgment by performing the following

- a Arrest anyone who may resisting or interfering with the enforcement of this final judgment in the present of such officer(s) as legal contempt of this Court,
- b Make any Police report and document all claims in such report when requested by the Plaintiffs or their authorized agents concerning any violations of the laws of this State
- c Take possession of Defendant's assets which may be in the legal possession of any banks, holding company, corporation, partnership or insurance company and,
- d Perform any other act which may ad in the enforcement of this final judgment provided however that such act may not conflict with the laws of this State

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That when assistance is requested by the Plaintiffs for the enforcement of any provisions of this final judgment said officer or officers shall assist the Plaintiffs and enforce the provisions of this final judgment

payment and satisfaction of this judgment to be made payable to the Plaintiff T L. Ware Bortling Company Inc., by the Defendant. Furthermore, this consent final judgment shall not be amended, modified or set aside by the parties or the Court without the consent of the parties Plaintiffs or without a notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs by the Clerk of this Court at the Plaintiffs' address of record in this action.

order of this Court in the above-styled civil matter and is entered as final judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(b) unless reversed, modified or set aside by any of the appellate Courts in this State

IT IS SO ORDERED. This

, 2005.

Hon. M. GIND BREGDON, Presiding Judge SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

IT IS HEREBY AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES,

Agreed and Consented to By:

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Michael R. Johnson, Sr.

Attorney for the Plaintiff Georgia Bar No. 395056

Johnson & Associates, P. C.

340 West Peachtree Street, N.E.

Suite 200

Atlanta, Georgia 30308

24 (404) 688-7100

Agreed and Consented to By:

Dr. Tony L. Ware, JD, Plaintiff Chairman & CEO P.O. Box 150524-Dept. 0227 Atlanta, Georgia 30315-0168 (404) 945-0342

# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TONY L. WARE, CEO, and T.L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC.,

Plaintiff.

Vs.

Civil Action 2004 CV 94553 Judge Bensonetta Tipton Lane

FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP., f/k/a BANKBOSTON CORP.,

Defendant

## ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND SETTING HEARING

The Fina! Judgment and Decree entered January 28, 2005, by the Presiding Judge is hereby VACATED. The Court will hear argument regarding the plaintiff's motion for default Judgment and the scope of any appropriate relief on Wednesday, February 16, 2005 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 1-D, 185 Central Avenue SW, Atlanta, GA 30303. This hearing is specially set. No continuances will be granted except upon written motion and for legal cause.

SO ORDERED, this 2 day of February, 2005

BENSONETTA TIPTON LANE, J Fulton Superior Court

Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Please serve

Mr Michael Robert Johnson Johnson & Associates, P C 340 W Peachtree Street, Suite 200 Atlanta, GA 30308-351? Phone 404-688-7100 Fax 404-230-2858

Dr Tony L Ware P O Box 150524-Dept 0227 J ucopy

2004 cv 94553

# CIVIL MOTIONS & STATUS CONFERENCE CALENDAR FEBRUARY 16, 2005 JUDGE BENSONETTA TIPTON LANE

The Court will hear argument in each of the matters listed below on February 16, 2005, at the times listed in Courtroom 1-D, 185 Central Avenue SW, Atlanta, GA 30303 These hearings are specially set. Attendance is mandatory. Unless a party has been excused from reporting for this hearing its failure to appear may result in the dismissal of its action or counterclaim for want of prosecution or in the striking of its answer. No continuances will be granted except upon written motion and for legal cause. The fact that the parties may not believe a status conference or hearing is not needed at this time does not constitute legal cause, do not seek to be excused from this calendar absent such factors as genuine hardship or the settlement of the underlying case. Any supplemental pleadings not previously due which the parties wish to submit in connection with this hearing must be filed by

February 14, 2005, with a courtesy copy to the Court in chambers, in order to be considered by the

The parties should be prepared to discuss the status of the case, including the following issues a) whether there are any pending motions and, if so, if they require a hearing, b) the ments of any pending motions that are ripe for consideration, c) the status of discovery, d) whether mediation would be helpful/appropriate, and, e) when the case can be ready for trial

All correspondence and phone inquiries regarding this calendar should be directed to Staff
Attorney Georgia Lord at (Phone) 404/302-8537, (Facsimile) 404/335-2864, Chambers of Judge
Bensonetta Tipton Lane, 185 Central Avenue SW, Room T-1955, Atlanta, GA 30303

COURT

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This Thursday, February

Georgia Kay Lord Staff Attorney for

Judge Bensonetta Tipton Lane Fulton County Superior Court

Copies to
All Listed Individuals

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Time	Case Number	Case Name	Purpose of Hearing	Counsel
09 30 A M	2003cv75769	Colonial Shoe Co v Kingo Shoes USA	Status Conference	Mr. Lee S. Goldstein Hassett Cohen Goldstein Port & Gottlieb One Lakeside Commons, Suite 990 990 Hammond Drive Atlanta, GA 30328 Phone 770-393-0990 Fax 770-901-9417 E-Mail lgoldstein@internetlegal.com  Mr. Mark David Hackett Mr. David B. Tieman Husch & Eppenberger The Heritage Center 736 Georgia Ave, Suite 300 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2059 Phone 423-266-5500 Fax 423-266-5499 E-Mail mark hackett@husch.com
09 30 A M	2003cv79446	Microbilt Corporation v Fidelity Nat'l Financial	Status Conference, Pending Request for Extension of Discovery	Mr Halsey George Knapp Jr Mr. Kevin H Hudson Foltz Martin LLC Five Piedmont Center, Suite 750 Atlanta, GA 30305-1509 Phone 404-231-9397 Fax 404-237-1659  Mr David Leshe Pardue Ms. Alycia K. Jastrehski Hartman, Simons, Spielman & Wood, LLP 6400 Powers Ferry Rd, NW, Suite 400 Atlanta, GA 30339-2949 Phone 770-226-1347 Fax 770-858-1095 E-Mail dpardue@hssw.com
09 45 A M	2002cv49078	Francine R Meyer and Thomas S Wickson v Steven B Waite and Elizabeth E Waite	Status Conference	Mr. Stanley M. Lefco Law Offices Stanley M Lefco P C 4651 Roswell Rd, G-602 Atlanta, GA 30342 Phone 404-843-9666 Fax 404-843-9667 E-Mail losml@aol.com Mr. Peter L. Lublin

09 45 A M	2004CV94220	THE CONCOURSE IV ASSOC VS FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS	Status Conference	McCalla Raymer Padrick Cobb Nichols & Clark, LLC 1544 Old Alabama Road Roswell, GA 30076-2102 Phone 770-643-7200 Fax 770-643-4062 E-Mail pli@mecalla.com Mr Samuel W Johnson Property Tax Consulting, LLC P O Box 421185 Atlanta, GA 30342-1185 Phone 404-943-0300 Fax 404-257-8770 Mr Robert L. Martin
10 00 A M	2004cv94553	TONY L WARE, CEO, et al, v FLEET	Plaintiff's Motion for Default	Mr. R. David Ware Fulton County Attorney's Office 141 Pryor Street, S.W., Suite 4038 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-730-7750 Fax 404-730-6324 E-Mail rlmjam@mindspring.com Mr. Michael Robert Johnson Johnson & Associates, P.C.
		BOSTON FINANCIAL CORP f/k/a BANKBOSTON CORP	Judgment	340 W Peachtree Street, Suite 200 Atlanta, GA 30308-3517 Phone 404-688-7100 Fax 404-688-7100 FleetBoston Financial Corporation c/o Mr M A Ferrucci 1209 Orange Street Wilmington, DE 19801
				FleetBoston Financial Corporation c/o Mr M A Ferrucci, CEO 50 Kennedy Plaza, 16 <sup>th</sup> Floor Providence, RI 02903
11 30 A M	HC00324	Johnah Peterson v Timothy C Ward, Warden	Status Conference Habeas Corpus Petition	Mr. Johnab Peterson GDC # 934975 Atlanta Men's Transitional Center 332 Ponce de Leon Avenue, NE Atlanta, GA 30308  Mr. Daniel Melvin King Jr. Daniel M. King, Jr., LLC P. O. Box 4329 Dublin, GA 31040 Phone 478-275-2255 Fax 478-275-2250

				Ms Anne Green Assistant District Attorney for Fulton County 136 Pryor Street Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-302-8515 Fax 404-730-5398
12 00 Noon	2003cv79080	Fulton County v 0 292 Acres of Land	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	Mr. Beryl Harold Weiner Mr. Thomas C Dempsey Weiner, Yancey, Dempsey & Diggs LLP South Tower Suite 990 1718 Peachtree St, N W Atlanta, GA 30309-2409 Phone 404-870-9990 Fax 404-870-9919  Mr Richard N Hubert Chamberlain Hrdlicka White Williams & Martin 191 Peachtree St, N E, 9th Floor Atlanta, GA 30303-1747 Phone 404-659-1410 Fax 404-659-1852
12 00 Noon	2004ev81032	Comparian, Inc v The Luckie Group	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	Mr. John Trotti The Trotti Law Firm LLC 17 Executive Park Drive, Suite 420 Atlanta, GA 30329 Phone 404-296-6002 Fax 404-420-2138 E-Mail jtrotti@trotti-law com  Mr. John C. Pennington P O Box 275 Helen, GA 30545 Phone 706-878-0033 Fax 706-878-9916
12 00 Noon	2004CV91417	Robert B Seamon and Pamela A Seamon vs George H Seamon	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	E-Mail jcppc@linkamerica net  Mr. Michael P. Froman  235 Peachtree Street, Suite 400  Atlanta, GA 30303-1400  Phone 404-880-9200  Fax 404-880-4662  E-Mail fromanattomey@mindspring.com  Mr. Ronald F. Degranski, II  321 Creekstone Ridge  Woodstock, GA 30188

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12 00 Noon	2004cv84071	Kenneth R Rogers and Wanda S Rogers F Fulton County Bd Of Tax Assessors	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	Ms. Becky W. Adelman Dixon Law Firm, P C 590 Means Street, Suite 200 P O Box 93664 Atlanta, GA 30377-0664 Phone 404-892-3551 Fax 404-892-4611 E-Mail bwadelman@mindspring.com  Ms. Valerie Anne Ross Fulton County Attorney's Office 141 Pryor Street, S W, Suite 4038 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone 404-730-7750 Fax E-Mail rossvalerie@yahoo.com
12 00 Noon	2004cv84709	Educational Visions Inc vs Hewlett Packard Company, Compaq Computer Corporation and Custom Edge Inc	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	Mr Richard J. Storrs  1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 1570 Atlanta, GA 30309 Phone 404-888-9600 Fax 404-888-0996 E-Mail rstorrs@storrslaw.com  Mr. Derek C. Abbott Mr Gilbert R. Saydah, Jr 1201 North Market Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Phone 302-575-7357 Fax 302-425-4664  Mr G. Wayne Hillis Jr Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs 1500 Marquis Two Tower 285 Peachtree Ctr Ave, N E Atlanta, GA 30303  Phone 404-420-5547 Fax 404-522-8409 E-Mail whillis@phrd.com
12 00 Noon	2004cv88841	Walter C Woodyard, II v Michael Glover	Status Conferences For Cases on Feb 28th Trial Calendar	Mr Kwame Lateef Townes Kwame Lateef Townes & Associates, LLC P O Box 2235 Stone Mountain, GA 30086 Phone 404-964-9022 Fax 770-498-5202  Mr Richard S. Alembik Richard S. Alembik Richard S. Alembik, P C 315 West Ponce de Leon Avenue, Ste 250 Decatur, GA 30030-2433 Phone 404-373-0205 Fax 404-795-8999

				E-Mail nck@alembik com
		}		
2 00 P M	2005cv96581	WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F A, vs EMBORG FOODS, USA, INC, KNUD AAGAARD- SVENDSEN and IRENA AAGAARD- SVENDSEN	Motion for Preliminary Injunction	Mr John E Robinson Mr. Gregory H Blazer McLarty, Robinson & Van Voorhies One Decatur Towncenter, Suite 330 150 E Ponce de Leon Avenue Decatur, GA 30030-2553 Phone 404-377-6464 Fax 404-377-3658 E-Mail jer@mcrovvlaw.com  Emborg Foods, USA, Inc. c/o Corporation Service Company 40 Technology Parkway South, #300 Norcross, GA 30092  Mr Knud Aagaard-Svendsen
				Ms. Irena Angaard-Svendsen 110 Kiveton Park Drive Roswell, GA 30075
2 30 P M	2004cv93092	YONG CUCCIA V HYONJU YI	Request for Restraining Order	Ms. Yong H. Cuccia  Mrs Hyonchu Yı
3 00 P M	2003cv68267	B Roper, LLC v Georgia Aerospace Manufacturing Systems, Inc	Status Conference and Argument on Pending Motions	Mr. Christopher Nolan Smith 130 North Crest Blvd, Suite B Macon, GA 31210-1876 Phone 478-477-8145 Fax 478-477-7823
				Mr. R. Gary Spencer R Gary Spencer, P C 1800 Peachtree Street, Suite 300 Atlanta, GA 30309 Phone 404-355-9717 Fax 404-352-5636 E-Mail gary@rgaryspencer.com

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TONY L. WARE, CEO and T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC., FILED IN OFFICE
FEB - 8 2005
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY GA

Plaintiffs,

VS

) CIVIL ACTION

FILE NUMBER: 2004CV94553

FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP. F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP.

**NOTICE OF APPEAL** 

Defendant.

# **NOTICE OF APPEAL**

**COMES NOW, TONY L. WARE, CEO,** Plaintiff proceeding by his attorneys in the above-styled civil action matter and hereby files his Notice of Appeal pursuant to **O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)** which the Plaintiff hereby appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court from final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and any other orders as it relates to the final judgment in this civil action

Therefore, the Clerk of this court shall please omit nothing in the record pertaining to Plaintiff's appeal. Furthermore, Appellant states that there are no transcripts of evidence of the proceedings to be filed for the inclusion of the record on Plaintiff's appeal.

You are required to prepare transmit the entire record on Plaintiff's appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court within (20) days from the date of filing this notice of appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal rather then Georgia Court of Appeal as it involves an action concerning an injunction and equitable relief and some errors of law pursuant to **O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)**. A copy of said final judgment is attached hereto as **Exhibit "A"**.

This 8th, day of Feb, 2005

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Respectfully Submitted,

Dr. Tony L. Ware, Appellant

P.O. Box 150524-Dept. 0227 Atlanta, Georgia 30315-0188 (404) 945-0342

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Page 2

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2	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
3	STATE OF GEORGIA
4	FEB W OFFICE
5	TONY L. WARE, CEO and
6	T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC., )  DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR DOURT FLATON COUNTY CA
7	Plaintiffs,
8	vs. ) CIVIL ACTION
	) FILE NUMBER: <u>2004CV94553</u>
9 10	FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP. )  F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP. ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	)
11	Defendant. )
12	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
13	
14	COMES NOW, TONY L. WARE, CEO, Plaintiff proceeding by his
1	attorneys in the above-styled civil action matter and hereby certify that I have served
15	the above-name Plaintiff T.L. WARE BOTTLING COMPANY, INC, at its
16	attorney addressed to the following.
17	Michael R. Johnson, Sr., Esq.
18	JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
19	340 West Peachtree Street, N.E.
20	Suite 200 Atlanta, Georgia 30308
	I - OH Feb
21	
22	Respectfully Submitted,
23	112.4-
24	Dr. Tony L. Ware, Appellant
25	



## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

# TONY L. WARE, CEO and T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC., Plaintiffs, vs. CIVIL ACTION FILE NUMBER: 2004CV94553 FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP., Defendant. Defendant. PRESIDING JUDGE BAXTER

# **ORDER**

The Plaintiffs in this civil matter having come before this Court for a hearing on their Motion to Set Aside an Order pursuant to O.C.G.A § 9-11-60(a) and (d)(1) with their consent in this action. Based upon the record in this action, the evidence presented to the Court by the parties and applicable State law the Court finds that as a matter of law sufficient grounds exist for the granting thereof. The Court hereby GRANT the Plaintiffs' joint Motion to Set Aside this Court's Order entered on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 vacating this Court's final judgment on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 as follows:

#### I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court makes the following findings of fact.

The Plaintiffs Tony L Ware, CEO and T L. Ware Bottling Company, Inc., brought this civil action on December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2004 based upon their ten count Complaint for Damages, Injunction, RICO violations, Fraud, Gross Negligence and other violations of both Federal and State laws and further requesting injunctive and other equitable relief concerning all other claims and disputes against the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation f/k/a/ BankBoston Corporation

After proper service of process of the Summons and Complaint on the Defendant on December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2004 by a Court Appointed Process Server, the Defendant failed to file its answer to the Summons and Complaint and became in default on January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

On January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 this Court entered a Final Judgment and Decree in favor of the Plaintiffs. See, Docket No. 10. Before any party could appeal such final judgment this Court entered a order vacating said final judgment on its own motion without a showing of any meritorious reason. See, Docket No. 11.

Contrary to the final judgment of this Court the Order vacating the final judgment did not state whether or not said final judgment was void or whether there were any nonamendable defects which may appear on the face of the record. The Court further finds that the final judgment entered in this action was not void for lack of jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter in this case. Nor are there any nonamedable defects which would authorized this Court to set aside or vacate the final judgment entered by this Court.

Thus the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 limited this Court's own inherent power and jurisdiction to amend, modify or set aside the final judgment as it relates to this case without first giving the Plaintiffs a notice of a hearing and a right to be heard by the Court prior to vacating and setting aside the final judgment of this Court. See, Docket No. 10 Final Judgment at Page 12

Therefore this Court finds that as a matter of law, there are no meritorious reasons to vacate the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and the Order vacating such final judgment is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction

#### II. DISCUSSION

Notwithstanding this Court's inherent authority over judgments within the same term of Court the final judgment entered in this action was rendered in chambers pursuant to **O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a)** This Court never exercised any legal discretion to vacate its final judgment nor did the Court give the Plaintiffs any meritorious reasons for vacating the final judgment. See, Docket No. 11 Order vacating judgment. Our Georgia Supreme Court has made it clear in *Pope v. Pope*, 277 **Ga.** 333, 588 **SE2d** 736 (2003) by stating the following:

"A trial court's discretion in setting aside a judgment will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused. However, trial Court's discretion to set aside a judgment during the term it was entered is not without limits, and should be exercised for some meritorious reason."

Thus the Order attempting to vacate the final judgment in this manner did not show that the Court exercised any legal discretion by showing a meritorious reason. The Georgia Supreme Court has also held in <u>Hurt Bidg., Inc. v. Atlanta</u>
<u>Trust Co.</u>, 181 Ga. 274, 182 SE 187 (1935) that

"While a motion to set aside a judgment a judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, it should not, although made during the term at which the judgment was rendered, be granted unless some meritorious reason is given thereof. The rule appears to have been generally adopted in almost all jurisdictions, that the power of control even during the term should be exercised only upon sufficient cause shown, and where the matter appeals to an exercise of sound legal discretion."

As stated herein the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 limited this Court's own power and jurisdiction to amend, modify or set aside the final judgment by first giving the Plaintiffs the right to a notice of a hearing and a right to be heard prior to the Court vacating or setting aside the final judgment of this Court. See, Docket No. 10 Final Judgment at Page 12 which reads in part that:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Plaintiffs has consented to the total payment and satisfaction of this judgment to be made payable to the Plaintiff T L Ware Bottling Company, Inc., by the Defendant Furthermore, this consent final judgment shall not be amended, modified or set aside by the parties or the Court without the consent of the parties Plaintiffs or without a notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs by the Clerk of this Court at the Plaintiffs' address of record in this action."

## III. CONCLUSION OF LAW

This provision of the final judgment was binding on this Court. Therefore, the Court concludes that there are no mentorious reasons to vacate the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and the Order vacating such final judgment without notice to the Plaintiffs and without their consent pursuant to the above stated provision of the final judgment is deemed void on its face for lack of jurisdiction. The Georgia Supreme Court has further held that

"A void judgment is no judgment. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceeding founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void."

See, <u>Steward vs. Golden</u>, 98 **Ga** 479, 25 **SE** 538 (1896) and also see <u>Shotgun vs. State</u>, 73 **Ga**. App. 136, 35 **SE2d** 556 (1945) cert denied, 329 **U.S**. 740, 67 **S.Ct**. 56, 91 **L.Ed** 638 (1946) See, **O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(a)** and **O.C.G.A. § 9-12-16** The Georgia Supreme Court has made it clear by stating:

"When a party has been afforded an opportunity to be heard, the court cannot suspend or vacate its judgment merely to let in a defense which should have been offered before the judgment was entered."

See, <u>Hurt Bidg.</u>, <u>Inc. v. Atlanta Trust Co.</u>, Supra This Court further concludes that the Order vacating the final judgment without having a meritorious reason and without notice to the Plaintiffs prior to vacating the final judgment violates the Plaintiffs Federal Constitutional rights to due process under law

**ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED,** That the Order vacating the final judgment entered on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 is hereby set aside and vacated and said order is deemed null and void on its face for lack of jurisdiction and because of a nonamendable defect which appears on the face of the record such as lack of notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs concerning the Court's own motion to vacate the final judgment without having a meritorious reason

entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 by the Honorable M. Gino Brogdon is effective and binding on this Court and all parties and is therefore the law of this case

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, By this Court that the Defendant and the Clerk of this Court is further directed to comply with all of the terms of the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 by the Honorable M. Gino Brogdon, Presiding Judge and that any further orders or judgments (except any orders of the Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals) which is entered in violation of the final judgment shall be deemed null and void as a matter of law

it is further ordered, By this Court that this order shall be made part of the final judgment of this Court and shall not be vacated or set aside by the Court without prior notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs shall have a right to file a motion for contempt for any persons violating this Order and the final judgment entered on January 28th, 2005 by this Court

IT IS SO ORDERED, This

day of

. 2005.

Hon. JERRY W. BAXTER, Presiding Judge SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

IT IS HEREBY CONSENTED TO BY THE PARTIES,

Consented to By:

Michael R. Johnson, Sr. Attorney for the Plaintiff

Georgia Bar No. 395056

Johnson & Associates, P. C.

340 West Peachtree Street, N.E.

Suite 200

Atlanta, Georgia 30308 (404) 688-7100 Consented to By:

Dr. Tony L. Ware, JD, Plaintiff Chairman & CEO

P.O. Box 150524-Dept. 0227

Atlanta, Georgia 30315-0188

(404) 945-0342

# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TONY L. WARE, CEO and T. L. WARE BOTTLING CO., INC.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

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
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FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP. F/K/A BANKBOSTON CORP.

Defendant.



CIVIL ACTION
FILE NUMBER: 2004CV94553

MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER

# MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER

COMPANY, INC., the Plaintiffs and files their Joint Motion to Set Aside Order entered on Febuary 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 as void and lack of notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(a) and (d)(1)(3) against the above-named Defendant FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION. Based upon the record in this action, the Defendant's admissions and applicable State, the Plaintiffs is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Plaintiffs shows the Court the following

#### I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiffs Tony L. Ware, CEO and T.L. Ware Bottling Company, Inc., brought this civil action on December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2004 based upon their ten count Complaint for Damages, Injunction, RICO violations, Fraud, Gross Negligence and other violations of both Federal and State laws and further requesting injunctive and other equitable relief concerning all other claims and disputes against the Defendant FleetBoston Financial Corporation f/k/a/ BankBoston Corporation

After proper service of process of the Summons and Complaint on the Defendant on December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2004 by a Court Appointed Process Server, the Defendant failed to file its answer to the Summons and Complaint and became in default on January 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005

On January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 this Court entered a Final Judgment and Decree in favor of the Plaintiffs. See, Docket No. 10. Before any party could appeal such final judgment this Court entered a order vacating said final judgment on its own motion without a showing of any meritorious reason. See, Docket No. 11.

Contrary to the final judgment of this Court the Order vacating the final judgment did not state whether or not said final judgment was void or whether there were any nonamendable defects which may appear on the face of the record. The Plaintiffs further avers that the final judgment entered in this action was not void for lack of jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter in this case. Nor are there any nonamedable defects which would authorized this Court to set aside or vacate the final judgment entered by this Court

Thus the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 limited this Court's own inherent power and jurisdiction to amend, modify or set aside the final judgment as it relates to this case without first giving the Plaintiffs a notice of a hearing and a right to be heard by the Court prior to vacating and setting aside the final judgment of this Court. See, Docket No. 10 Final Judgment at Page 12

Therefore Plaintiffs avers that as a matter of law, there are no meritorious reasons to vacate the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and the Order vacating such final judgment is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction

## II. DISCUSSION

Notwithstanding this Court's inherent authority over judgments within the same term of Court the final judgment entered in this action was rendered in chambers pursuant to **O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a)** This Court never exercised any legal discretion to vacate its final judgment nor did the Court give the Plaintiffs any meritorious reasons for vacating the final judgment. See, Docket No. 11 Order vacating

judgment Our Georgia Supreme Court has made is clear in <u>Pope v. Pope</u>, 277 Ga. 333, 588 SE2d 736 (2003) by stating the following

"A trial court's discretion in setting aside a judgment will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused. However, trial Court's discretion to set aside a judgment during the term it was entered is not without limits, and should be exercised for some meritorious reason."

Thus the Order attempting to vacate the final judgment in this manner do not show that the Court exercised any legal discretion by showing a meritorious reason. The Georgia Supreme Court has also held in <u>Hurt Bidg., Inc. v. Atlanta Trust Co.</u>, 181 **Ga.** 274, 182 **SE** 187 (1935) that

"While a motion to set aside a judgment a judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, it should not, although made during the term at which the judgment was rendered, be granted unless some meritorious reason is given thereof. The rule appears to have been generally adopted in almost all jurisdictions, that the power of control even during the term should be exercised only upon sufficient cause shown, and where the matter appeals to an exercise of sound legal discretion."

As stated herein the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 limited this Court's own power and jurisdiction to amend, modify or set aside the final judgment by first giving the Plaintiffs a notice of a hearing and a right to be heard before the Court before vacating or setting aside the final judgment of this Court. See, Docket No. 10 Final Judgment at Page 12 which reads in part that

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Plaintiffs has consented to the total payment and satisfaction of this judgment to be made payable to the Plaintiff T L. Ware Bottling Company, Inc., by the Defendant Furthermore, this consent final judgment shall not be amended, modified or set aside by the parties or the Court without the consent of the parties Plaintiffs or without a notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs by the Clerk of this Court at the Plaintiffs' address of record in this action."

## III. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

This provision of the final judgment was binding on this Court. Therefore, the Plaintiffs concludes that there are no meritorious reasons to vacate the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and the Order vacating such final judgment without notice to the Plaintiffs and without their consent pursuant to the above stated provision of the final judgment is deemed void on its face for lack of jurisdiction. The Georgia Supreme Court has further held that

"A void judgment is no judgment. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceeding founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void."

See, <u>Steward vs. Golden</u>, 98 Ga. 479, 25 SE 538 (1896) and also see <u>Shotgun vs. State</u>, 73 Ga. App. 136, 35 SE2d 556 (1945) cert denied, 329 U.S. 740, 67 S.Ct. 56, 91 L.Ed 638 (1946) See, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(a) and O.C.G.A. § 9-12-16 The Georgia Supreme Court has made it clear by stating

"When a party has been afforded an opportunity to be heard, the court cannot suspend or vacate its judgment merely to let in a defense which should have been offered before the judgment was entered."

See, <u>Hurt Bidg., Inc. v. Atlanta Trust Co.</u>, Supra This Court further concludes that the Order vacating the final judgment without having a meritorious reason and without notice to the Plaintiffs prior to vacating the final judgment violates the Plaintiffs Federal Constitutional rights to due process under law

**WHEREFORE,** The Plaintiffs hereby prays and demands that this Court enter an ORDER setting aside and vacating the order of February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 for lack of jurisdiction and notices the Plaintiffs as a matter of law. The Plaintiffs request that the Court further grant the following relief to wit

1 That the Court set aside and vacate the final judgment entered on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2005 which is deemed null and void on its face for lack of

jurisdiction and because of a nonamendable defect which appears on the face of the record such as lack of notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs concerning the Court's own motion to vacate the final judgment without having a meritorious reason

- 2 That the final judgment entered on January 28th, 2005 by the Honorable M Gino Brogdon be effective and binding on this Court and all parties and is therefore the law of this case
- 3 That the Defendant and the Clerk of this Court be directed to comply with all of the terms of the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>. 2005 by the Honorable M. Gino Brogdon, Presiding Judge and that any further orders or judgments (except any orders of the Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals) which is entered in violation of the final judgment shall be deemed null and void as a matter of law and,
- 4 That this order shall be made part of the final judgment of this Court and shall not be vacated or set aside by the Court without prior notice of a hearing to the Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs shall have a right to file a motion for contempt for any persons violating this Order and the final judgment entered on January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005 by this Court

This 7th day of Feb \_\_\_\_ , 2005.

Agreed and Consented to By:

Michael R. Johnson, Sr.

Attorney for the Plaintiff
Georgia Bar No. 395056
Johnson & Associates, P. C.
340 West Peachtree Street, N.E.

Suite 200 Atlanta, Georgia 30308 (404) 688-7100 Agreed and Consented to By:

Tony L. Ware, JD, Plaintiff Chairman & CEO

1033 Kipling Street S.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30315-7030 (404) 945-0342

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# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the within and foregoing **NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION** upon all parties to this matter by causing to be deposited in the U.S. Mail, proper postage prepaid, a true copy of same addressed as follows:

Michael R. Johnson, Sr (also served via courier) Johnson & Associates, P C. 340 West Peachtree Street, N.E Suite 200 Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Dr. Tony L. Ware, PhD, JD Post Office Box 150524 - Dept 0227 Atlanta, Georgia 30315

This 15th day of February, 2005.

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